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Phillips: Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Corporate and Com

PRODUCTS LIABILITY OF SUCCESSOR
CORPORATIONS: A CORPORATE AND
COMMERCIAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
David Morris Phillips*
INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, when one corporation purchased substantially all
the operating assets, including goodwill, from another, the successor 1
was not liable for the damages resulting from defective products
manufactured by its predecessor.2 Exceptions to this doctrine were
limited to situations where (1) the successor explicitly or implicitly
agreed to assume the liabilities of the predecessor corporation,3 (2)

the transaction constituted a merger between the predecessor and
successor corporations,4 (3) a substantial continuity of ownership

and/or management interests existed between the predecessor and
Copyright 0 1982 by David Morris Phillips.
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. B.A., 1964, Brandeis University;
J.D., 1967, Columbia University. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Mark Smith
for his excellent research assistance and to Clay Gillettee, Jim Henderson and Paul Wallace
for their helpful comments.
1. For the purpose of this article, a "successor" or "successor corporation" is a corporate
purchaser of the assets, including goodwill, of another corporation that dissolves after settling
claims of known creditors and distributing its net liquid assets to shareholders. The purchaser
may have acquired less than the total assets of the previous owner. In addition, the term encompasses a party who purchases the assets from an intermediate corporation that purchased
the assets directly from the manufacturer. See Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. 361,
431 A.2d 826 (1981); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
2. The terms "predecessor" and "predecessor corporation" will be used to refer to the
entity that owned the assets at the time the defective products were manufactured, and subsequently sold the assets to a successor. See supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., Bouton v. Litton Indus., Inc., 423 F.2d 643, 652 (3d Cir. 1970); Bippus v.
Norton Co., 437 F. Supp. 104, 106 (E.D. Pa. 1977). For general discussions of the traditional
approach to assumption of products liability by successor corporations, see Note, Assumption
of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86 (1975); Annot., 66
A.L.R. 3d 824 (1975).
4. See, e.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 363 (3d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 800
(W.D. Mich. 1974).
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successor corporations, 5 or (4) the predecessor corporation's liquidation constituted a fraud on its creditors.'

In several notable decisions, however, Ray v. Alad Corp.,7 a
California case, and Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc.,8 and

Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp.,9 New Jersey cases, courts-have held
that successor corporations can be sued for product liability claims
arising out of the manufacture and sale of defective products by
predecessor corporations, despite the absence of circumstances which
would make one or more of the exceptions to the general rule applicable. 10 Quite the contrary, the purchase and sale agreements in
Ray, Ramirez and Nieves, evinced the parties' intent to exclude an
5. See, e.g., Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 138 La. 743, 70 So. 789
(1916).
Of the various categories of exceptions to the traditional general rule that a successor
corporation is not liable for the torts of its predecessor, the continuation exception has been
subject to the most expansion in recent years. For example, although continuity of ownership
between the predecessors and successors was lacking, the Supreme Court of Michigan, in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976), and the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974), used the continuation of enterprise exception to hold that successors could be sued for tort claims arising from
defective products manufactured by their predecessors.
The courts in Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977),
Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 NJ. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981), and Nieves v. Bruno
Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981), might have decided those cases on continuation grounds, but that analysis-particularly, as applied to the Ramirez and Nieves fact
patterns, where the successor corporations had 'not acquired the assets and goodwill directly
from the manufacturing corporations, see supra note 1-would have been tenuous.
6. See, e.g., Hibernia Ins. Co. v. St. Louis & New Orleans Transp. Co., 13 F. 516
(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1882), afrd, 120 U.S. 166 (1887); United States v. Plastic Electro-Finishing
Corp., 313 F. Supp. 330 (E.D.N.Y. 1970); Econoiiy Refining & Serv. Co. v. Royal Nat'l
Bank, 20 Cal. App. 3d 434, 97 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1971).
Each of the four traditional exceptions were delineated in McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co.,
109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Law Div. 1970), a.fd, 118 NJ. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585
(App. Div. 1972).
7. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
8. 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
9. 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981).
10. Ray. Ramlrez and Nieves are said to have initiated a fifth category of exception to
the general rule, one based on product line. See Infra notes 14-15. Cases predicated on Ray,
Ramlrez and Nieves also lack the traditional bases for liability. See Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615
F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1980); Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr.
119 (1979); Powers v. Baker-Perkins, Inc., 92 Mich. App. 645, 285 N.W.2d 402 (1979); Dep't
of Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1151 (1980); Dawejko v.
Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa. Super. 15, 434 A.2d 106 (1981).
For cases rejecting the product line theory where none of the traditional exceptions applied, see Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Bernard v. Kee Mfg.
Co., 409 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 1982); Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 70 Il. App. 3d 664, 388
N.E.2d 778 (1979); Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 111 Mich. App. 343, 314 N.W.2d 614
(1981).
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assumption of liabilities beyond those specifically enumerated. 1
Even more significantly, none of the successor corporations manufactured the model of product alleged to have been defective, although
they were engaged in manufacturing the same line of products bearing the predecessor's trade name or mark.' 2 Rather than treating the
issue of successor liability as a matter of corporate or commercial
law, the New Jersey and California courts focused upon tort law and
justified the potential liability of successor corporations primarily on
the basis of the desirability of spreading the risk of accidents among
all product users and other considerations that led to the expansion
of strict liability in tort.' 3
The legal commentary that usually accompanies decisions that
depart from long established precedent has already appeared. The
commentators generally argue that these recent cases conflict with
corporate and commercial law doctrine,' 4 but that, despite such inconsistency, the decisions are defensible, indeed desirable, on the basis of the products liability grounds enunciated by the courts.1 5 In
this article, I take issue with both lines of reasoning. I first argue
that the ratiocination tendered by the courts, particularly the desirability of spreading the cost of accidents, is insufficient, without fur11. 19 Cal. 3d at 27, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577 (parties did not provide for
assumption of tort liabilities); 86 N.J. at 371, 431 A.2d at 831-32 (express agreement not to
assume); 86 N.J. at 338-39, 431 A.2d at 814 (express agreement not to assume).
12. Although it was essential to the reasoning of Ray and subsequent cases that the
successor corporation continued to manufacture the same product line as that of the predecessor, it seems that the successor in Ray never manufactured the same model of ladder as that
which caused the injury. See 19 Cal. 3d at 27, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576. The age
of the drill presses, as well as other facts, make it unlikely that the successors in Ramirez and
Nieves manufactured the same models. See infra text accompanying notes 18-19.
13. 19 Cal. 3d at 30-31, 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80; 86 N.J. at 351, 431
A.2d at 821-22.
14. See, e.g., Note, Ray v. Alad Corporation:Imposing Liability on the Successor Corporationfor the Defective Products of the Predecessor Corporation,15 CAL. W.L. REv. 338,
354-57 (1979); Note, PostdissolutionProduct Claims and the Emerging Rule of Successor
Liability, 64 VA. L. REV. 861, 862-64 (1978); Recent Developments, Products LiabilityCorporations-AssetSales and Successor Liability, 44 TENN. L. REv. 905, 906-07 (1977).
15. See, e.g., Note, PostdissolutionProduct Claims and the Emerging Rule of Successor Liability,supra note 14, at 879-80; Recent Developments, ProductsLiability-Liabilityof
Transfereefor Defective Products Manufactured by Transferor,30 VAND. L. REV. 238, 257
(1977). For other discussions of the products line exception, see Note, Ramirez v. Amsted
Industries, Inc.: New Jersey Adopts the "'Product Line" Approach to Successor Corporation
Liability, 33 MERCER L. REV. 681 (1982); Note, Products Liability-Corporations-Intermediateand Successor CorporationsStrictly Liable Under Product
Line Standard, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 327 (1982); Note, ProductsLiability for Successor
Corporations:A Break from Tradition, 49 U. CoLo. L. REv. 357 (1978) (outlining background and possible effects of Ray).
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ther elaboration, to hold the successor corporations liable on a principled basis. The plaintiffs' equities in the cases seem problematic,",
but the primary analytic flaw has been the courts' failure to establish
a satisfactory nexus between the plaintiffs' claims and the defendants' responsibility for the harm. I then argue that such responsibility can be established on the basis of the defendant's participation in
foreseeably increasing the recourse risk17 of tort victims. In this regard, corporate and commercial law can provide useful analogies and
perspectives to establish the successor's legal responsibility.
ANALYSIS OF RECENT SUCCESSOR LIABILITY CASES

The plaintiffs in these recent cases may have trouble convincing
some people of their own equities. Ray, Ramirez and Nieves were
injured while using products manufactured and sold by predecessor
corporations many years prior to their injuries. In Ramirez, the
power press was manufactured at least twenty-six years prior to the
plaintiff's injury;18 the power press that injured Nieves' arm was
manufactured some thirty-five years before the injury. 9 Nevertheless, the tort law perspective adopted by the California and New
Jersey courts does not suffer primarily in the findings that the plaintiffs were deserving parties entitled to recover from someone. Unless
one rejects recovery on the basis of strict liability in tort (the merits
of which this article does not take a position on, one way or another)
and initiation of the statutory limitations period only upon injury, 20
these plaintiffs are as equally deserving as other plaintiffs in products
liability cases where the seller-manufacturer has remained in
business.
The primary analytic flaw in the decisions has been the courts'
failure to articulate valid bases for finding that the particulardefen16. See Infra text accompanying notes 18-19.
17. For a definition of recourse risk, see Infra text accompanying notes 26-27.
18. Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. at 335, 431 A.2d at 812-13.
19. Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. at 365, 431 A.2d at 828. Injury from a
product, long after the manufacture of the product, does not necessarily mean that the manufacturer produced a defective product. Rather, the product may merely have exceeded its normal useful life. With the exception of certain machinery and real property, few assets have
depreciable periods that exceed thirty years. See generally Rev. Proc. 77-10, § 3, 1977-1 C.B.
548, 549-68 (1977). It should be possible to dismiss summarily some of these product liability
cases where the injury occurs many years after sale, whether or not the original manufacturer
exists at the time of suit. Arguably, a point of sale statute of limitation makes more sense than
one that commences on the date of injury, but I leave discussion about the relative merits of
the two approaches to my torts brethren.
20. See supra note 19.
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dants should be susceptible to suit. The problem of nexus inheres in
all of substantive law, whether categorized as torts, corporations,
commercial law or otherwise.2 ' For much of our legal history, this
problem has been referred to as the duty question: Did the particular
defendant owe the plaintiff a duty?2 2 Whatever the phraseology, this
issue has always been considered distinct from whether the plaintiff
has been harmed,23 and should continue to be so in the successor
liability area.
In the New Jersey and California Supreme Courts' opinions, the
courts emphasize, on one hand, the desirability of spreading the cost
of accidents among all users or purchasers and, on the other, the
acquisition and present enjoyment of the predecessor's goodwill by
the successor corporation.24 In addition, the California Supreme
Court premised its holding on the liquidation of the predecessor cor25
poration, and, hence, its nonavailability for suit.
In order to understand why these considerations require further
elaboration before they can serve as the bases for holding the successor susceptible to suit, two product-related risks that the purchaser
or user faces can be distinguished. The first is the risk of defective
quality, the risk to which commercial doctrines of warranty 2 and
tort doctrines of negligence and strict liability27 respond. The second
risk is that if the product proves to be defective, such that a cause of
action arises against its manufacturer, the manufacturer may not be
available to compensate the injured party. I refer to the first risk as
the "quality risk" and the second as the "recourse risk." The issue of
successor liability concerns the recourse risk.
.The cost-spreading rationale of Ramirez relates to both the
21.

For a discussion of how nexus applies to tort law, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
§ 1, at 5 (4th ed. 1971); J. HENDERSON, JR., & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS
ed. 1981). The importance of nexus in corporate law is demonstrated by
comparing the right of stockholders to sue corporate directors in derivative suits with the lack
of a similar right on the part of option holders. See Harif v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del.
Ch. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975). For a discussion of commercial
law and the role of nexus, see C. FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 7-21 (1981).
22. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 342, 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928)
("before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back of the act must be sought and found
a duty to the individual complaining" (citations omitted)).
23. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 53, at 324 (4th ed. 1971).
24. See 19 Cal. 3d at 32, 560 P.2d at 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80; 86 N.J. at 369-72,
431 A.2d at 830-32; 86 N.J. at 350-53, 431 A.2d at 820-22.
25. See 19 Cal. 3d at 32, 560 P.2d at 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80.
26. See U.C.C. § 2-313 to -318 (1978).
27. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).

THE LAW OF TORTS
PROCESS 115-63 (2d
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quality and recourse risks, but hardly requires successor liability.
Theoretically, the desirability of spreading the costs of accidents
could lead to such alternative conclusions as the plaintiff being able
to sue any manufacturer in the same line of business, the largest
existing manufacturer at the time of injury or suit, or the government as a residual cost spreader for society.2 8
Lack of an original manufacturer to sue relates specifically to
the recourse risk, but, again, without further elaboration, tells us
nothing about the successor's responsibility for the risk. The nonavailability of the manufacturer, by itself, could lead to a remediless
plaintiff or the liability of almost anyone.
Of the considerations relied upon by the California and New
Jersey courts, the defendant's enjoyment of the predecessor's goodwill comes the closest to providing the necessary nexus: It relates to
the recourse risk and provides cause for the successor to bear that
risk. But the courts' discussion of goodwill does not adequately address this point. Implicit in the courts' opinions is that the defendant
benefits from the goodwill of the product manufactured by the defendant's predecessor.2 9 Accordingly, the impression we are left with

is that the value of that goodwill would be enhanced undeservedly if
the defendant was not held liable. This reasoning hardly withstands
scrutiny.
Whether or not the successor corporation is held liable, the
value of the goodwill it has purchased automatically decreases once
an accident occurs through use of a product bearing the same trade
name as the successor's products.30 The day before an accident, potential customers of the successor would have been evaluating products bearing the trade name as having a safety record which exceeds
the valuation that they are willing to give after the accident. While
information of this nature is not immediately dispersed into the marketplace, information dissemination with respect to product quality
is probably much more efficient than one would first think.3 1 Cer28. See generally Y. AHARONi, THE No-RISK SociETY 76-98 (1981) (discussing role
that federal government has already assumed as insurer against nearly everything from old age
to natural disasters, loan defaults and bank failures).
29. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 31, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580; Ramirez
v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. at 352, 431 A.2d at 822.
30. See MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY Act § 104, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,722
(1979) (successor's reputation may be damaged by predecessor's defective products).
31. As evidence of this, note the widespread popularity of Consumer Reports and Consumers' Research and the heavy emphasis on product evaluation in such trade and hobby
journals as Stereo Review, Video Review, Cycle, and PopularPhotography.
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tainly, if suit is brought with wide press coverage, experience reveals
that the value of the product name can drop substantially.32 Thus,
the defendants, like the plaintiffs in these cases, are injured when the
products prove to be defective. These suits, then, produce the spectre
of one injured party suing another; both seem to have been injured
by the same party, the seller-predecessor corporation. The goodwill
perspective seemingly adopted by the courts hardly buttresses their
decisions because permitting the plaintiffs to recover against the defendants may result in double injury to the latter.
In favor of the courts' reliance upon a successor's purchase of its
predecessor's goodwill, it may be argued that the value which the
successor paid the predecessor for goodwill reflected not only the
probability of favorable sales from use of the trade name, but also
the probability of loss of sales because the successor's products
would be associated with products previously manufactured by the
predecessor that would prove to be defective. If the probable benefit
exceeded the risk of loss of goodwill from the predecessor's defective
products, the goodwill still had a positive value to the successor.
Even if this assumption is made, however, we can conclude only that,
although the goodwill was worth less after the injury than before, 33
it was not worth less after the accident than the defendant-successor
bargained for. We cannot conclude that the goodwill was worth
more than the defendant bargained for, which seems to be the leap
of faith some courts would have us make.
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW OBSTACLES TO SUCCESSOR
LIABILITY

Is it correct that the courts' holdings in these recent products
liability cases conflict with corporate and commercial law principles?
One would think so, given the failure of the courts to recognize corporate doctrine as a point of departure.
This failure, as well as the related weakness of their arguments
to support the defendant successors' responsibility for the plaintiffs'
injuries, limits the acceptability of these holdings to courts that may
confront the same issue in the future. Two conflicts would seem par32.

For example, Ford Pinto's share of the subcompact market dropped sharply from the

usual 11% or 12% to only 6.7% following widely publicized suits in 1978 involving potentially
dangerous fuel tanks. The model has since been discontinued. Gray, Putting the Pinto Out to

Pasture after a Decade, ADVERISING AGE, Apr. 7, 1980, at 64.
33. The certainty of a defective product, by definition, results in a greater loss of goodwill than a probability of defect less than 100%.
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amount: inconsistency between the courts' holdings and the doctrine
of corporate entity,3 ' and the courts' disregard of the intent of the
immediate partiesaP-the predecessor and successor corporations-as
the prime criterion for decisionmaking. Upon analysis, however,
these conflicts turn out to be mere straw men.
The Doctrine of CorporateEntity
Aside from the concept of fiduciary obligations, no subject matter pervades corporate law more than the doctrine of corporate entity. It is the doctrinal underpinning of holdings that a corporation
can assent to wrongs committed against it,"6 that corporate attorneys
represent the corporation distinct from its shareholders,3 7 and, most
recently, that states may not tax corporations within their borders on
account of their subsidiaries' income.38 The Internal Revenue Code's
taxation of both corporate earnings 9 and dividends received by
shareholders 40 reflects the same concept: A corporation is an entity
distinct from its shareholders.4 1 But most importantly, the doctrine
of corporate entity ordinarily precludes suits against shareholders on
account of debts owed or wrongs committed by their corporations. 2
Thus, as it is commonly stated, shareholders enjoy limited liability.4 3
If the corporate veil cannot be pierced to allow a tort victim of
34. An argument based upon the corporate entity theory seems to have been made by
the defendant-successor corporation in Ramirez. Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. at
351, 431 A.2d at 821. The argument also has been intimated elsewhere. See, e.g., Powers v.
Baker-Perkins, Inc., 92 Mich. App. 645, 667, 285 N.W.2d 402, 413 (1979).
35. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206,
215-16 (1908).
37. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a) (Final Draft 1981), reprinted in 67 A.B.A. J. 1299 (1981).
One consequence of the concept that the lawyer represents the corporation as distinct
from its shareholders is that, in a shareholders' derivative suit, the work product of the corporate attorneys or confidences between them and the corporate officers and directors are sometimes held not subject to shareholder discovery. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
38. See ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 102 S. Ct. 3103 (1982) (exempting
from state income tax income of foreign subsidiary operated as discrete business enterprise);
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Dep't, 102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982) (employing
same reasoning as in ASARCO).
39. I.R.C. § 11 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
40. Id. § 61(a)(7) (1976).
41. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 25 (1982).
42. See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 417, 223 N.E.2d 6, 7-8, 276 N.Y.S.2d
585, 587 (1966).
43. See, e.g., 13A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 6213 (rev. perm. ed. 1961).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss1/5

8

Phillips: Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Corporate and Com
1982]

SUCCESSOR CORPORATE LIABILITY

corporate conduct to sue its shareholders, how can liability be imposed on a successor corporation? Shareholders at least derived some
benefit, indirectly if not directly, from the sale of the defective product. Moreover, they have some ability to control the actions of the
corporate managers, through their ability to choose the board of directors.4 4 The latter, in turn, elect the officers, the corporation's primary agents. 45 The chain of control, which involves a multitude of
steps, may be more theoretical than real.46 Nevertheless, it may be
contended that the shareholders maintain ultimate control as well as
receive benefits. In contrast, a successor corporation does not derive
any benefit from the fact that its predecessor has manufactured a
defective product, and certainly plays no role in controlling those
employees who manufactured defective products. It would appear,
therefore, that a successor corporation deserves more protection from
liability than a shareholder.
Yet, it is crucial not to accept as reality the metaphysics of the
entity doctrine and, on the basis of that "reality," conclude that corporate entity theory stands as a bar to the liability of successor corporations. The doctrine of corporate entity is nothing more, nor less,
than a legal fiction. This fiction may lead to sound results under
most circumstances. But that is beside the point. Of importance is
that the doctrine is a legal construct designed to serve certain interests. Only by analyzing, in a particular setting, whether the value of
the interests served by treating the corporation as a legal entity exceeds the value of interests adversely affected by upholding the legal
construct can we discover whether the doctrine has been soundly utilized.47 Phrased differently, courts generally utilize the corporate en48
tity doctrine when the resulting benefits exceed the costs.
It is regrettable that courts do not disclose more openly that
they simply are balancing interests when they use the corporate entity doctrine. If they did, more forthright debate might ensue about
44. See id. § 36.
45. Id. § 50.
46. See generally A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 86-87 (1933).
47. Doctrinal simplicity is itself a weighty interest that has to be considered. Thus, the
textual remark is not intended to convey the impression that the determination will be simply
based upon ad hoc considerations.
48. One interesting case where the court found the costs to exceed the benefits is Bangor
Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974). In the Bangor
Punta case, the cost of recognizing the distinction between the corporation and its shareholders
was, assertedly, a windfall to the corporation's shareholders. See id. at 711-15.
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which interests are preeminent in a particular setting, how much
weight should be accorded to each interest, and how these interests
are served or disserved by upholding or disregarding the fictional
separation of a corporation from its shareholders.
Limited liability, for example, is defended on the ground that it
attracts necessary capital.4 9 In a society with considerable specialization, the same parties who can supply capital do not necessarily have
the expertise or time to manage the enterprise. Parties who do not
control how their funds are utilized are not apt to transfer such
funds if the risk in doing so extends well beyond their investment.
The interest against which attraction of capital must be balanced in situations where creditors seek to pierce the corporate veil
and hold stockholders liable is "fairness" to such creditors. 50 If a
corporation's assets are insufficient to compensate creditors for their
claims, it would seem fair to allow them, in some situations, to pursue stockholders who stood to benefit most from the corporate venture. This fairness argument is not compelling, however, in the case
of contract creditors. Most, if not all, contract creditors have the
opportunity to assess the recourse risk and to adjust their credit
terms accordingly.51 Financial institutional creditors, such as banks,
are in the very business of assessing and profitting from risk; they
even assert their superior expertise at doing so. 5 2 Trade creditors,53 if
not themselves able to adjudge the recourse risk, generally subscribe
to credit rating firms that assess the risk equally as well as institutional creditors. 5 ' Viewed in this light, contract creditors can be perceived as investors in the enterprise who prefer a different combination of risk and return than stockholder investors. 55 Thus, fairness to
contract creditors generally presents only a false conflict with the
49. See Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations,43 U. Cm.L. REV.
499, 503 (1976).
50. See Horowitz, Disregardingthe Entity of Private Corporations,14 WASH. L. REV.
285, 285-89 (1939).
51. See Posner, supra note 49, at 501-05 (discussing interplay between credit terms and
risk).
52. Id. at 505.
53. Trade creditors include, most notably, merchants who do not insist on transacting
business on a cash basis. Id.
54. Dun and Bradstreet, for example, is one such firm. Among other things, they assess
risk for others. See DUN'S MARKETING SERVICES, MILLION DOLLAR DIRECTORY at iv-v
(1982).
55. It generally makes little more sense to allow contract creditors to sue stockholders
when a business fails, than it would to allow stockholders to sue contract creditors. In either
case, an investor class is seeking, post-factum, to shift to another the risk it knowingly
assumed.
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goal of attracting capital. Accordingly, the latter goal dominates,
and corporate entity theory is applied to bar stockholder liability.
In contrast, fairness to the tort claimant does present a real conflict. Tort claimants rarely have the opportunity to assess recourse
risk. Moreover, even if they had the opportunity to assess the recourse risk prior to the tort, in practice they generally do not have
the experience to do so." Despite the reality of the conflict of interests, however, stockholders are generally immune from personal liability if corporate assets are insufficient to compensate the tort victim.5 7 The law simply considers attraction of capital an interest
greater than the resulting unfairness to the tort claimant.
Limited liability does not mean an absence of liability, however.
The stockholders' equity, at least, must be at risk. OtherWise, stockholders would hardly have internalized the risk of their investment
decision. 58 Absence of all liability would result in free speculation,
not investment, on the part of stockholders. Creditors would then
find themselves in the ironic and unexpected position of having assumed both a higher level of risk and a lower rate of return when
transacting with the corporation. In this context, any presumed conflict between attraction of capital and fairness to the creditors is also
a false one; only the latter consideration is at stake.
Such a false conflict occurs when, having manufactured and put
products into the mainstream of commerce by means of the corporation, stockholders sell its assets and liquidate without providing for.
tort claims that can be expected to arise in the ordinary course of
events. Based on past experience, a manufacturer knows that some
number of claims of uncertain amount will arise in the future.5 '
While the identity of the claimants is unknown and perhaps unknowable, the fact that there will be claimants is ascertainable. Given the
existence of a body of jurisprudence that would potentially make the
56.
57.

See infra text accompanying notes 102-04.
See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 25.

58. See Posner, supra note 49, at 503.
59.

This forms the basis of a manufacturer's regularly procuring insurance on account of

such potential claims.
A useful analogy to planning for future product claims is found in the accounting treat-

ment of product warranty liability. See U.C.C. § 2-313 to -316 (1978). Although amounts
owed as a result of products liability claims are not reported until after a claim has been filed,
product warranty liability is accrued by the seller as of the date of sale. W. MmGs, A. MOSICH
& C. JOHNSON, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 411-12 (4th ed. 1978). Liability incurred under
product warranties can often be estimated quite accurately based on past experience. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS-ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS, Statement No. 5, Accountingfor Contingencies 3 (1978).
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manufacturer liable for the product liability claims of parties injured
by its products, liquidation, without provision for tort claims,
amounts to a failure on the stockholders' part to internalize all the
costs of doing business. They have absconded with the fruits without
paying all costs associated with the planting and harvest.
In short, where the stockholders participate in increasing the recourse risk of third parties by failing to provide for tort claims arising after liquidation, corporate entity theory should not offer shareholders immunity from suit. Although this analysis in no way
establishes the liability of successor corporations, it does demonstrate
that such liability does not necessarily conflict with corporate entity
theory on the notion that even stockholders could not be held liable.
Intention of the Parties
If conflict with the doctrine of corporate entity does not stand as
a bar to successor liability, neither should the intent of the immediate parties. Successor liability in these products liability cases does
contradict the intent of the parties; in each case the predecessor and
successor corporations agreed that the successor would not assume
liabilities other than those itemized on schedules appended to the
purchase and sale agreement. 60 It is also true that corporate and
commercial law doctrines heavily rely upon the intent of the parties.
In particular, adherence to intent explains one of the recognized exceptions to the earlier rule that successor corporations would not be
held liable: the express or implicit assumption of liability by a successor corporation. 1 Although the successor should be held liable
where it has agreed to assume liabilities, however, it does not follow
that it should escape liability where the announced intent is otherwise. Whole areas of the intersection of commercial and corporate
law doctrines concern protection of creditors who are not parties to
particular agreements; 62 such protection often results in disregard of
the parties' intentions. Courts even have been willing to hold stockholders liable to third party creditors who dealt with the corporate
entity subsequent to agreement between the corporation and its
60. See supra note 11.
61. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
62. The purpose of the UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 1-14, 7A U.L.A.
161 (1978), is to protect such creditors. Hearn 45 St. Corp. v. Jano, 283 N.Y. 139, 142, 27

N.E.2d 814, 816 (1940); Running v. Widdes, 52 Wis. 2d 254, 259, 190 N.W.2d 169, 172
(1971). See Infra text accompanying notes 64-80 (discussing fraudulent conveyances and successor corporations).
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shareholders as to the extent of their contribution. 3
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW DOCTRINE AS A SOURCE OF

NExus

Corporate entity doctrine and transactional intent, as understood in corporate and commercial law, may not conflict with the
possibility of successor liability, but demonstrating a lack of conflict
is not equivalent to establishing a connection between injured user
and successor corporation sufficient to hold the successor liable for
its predecessor's torts. The problem of nexus remains. At least three
doctrines or perspectives common to corporate and commercial law
can help to provide grounds for suit against successor corporations:
fraudulent conveyance law, bulk sales law (related to fraudulent conveyance law), and risk allocation analysis.
Fraudulent Conveyances
A fraudulent conveyance occurs when property is sold under circumstances in which creditors of the seller are defrauded.6 The
seller may continue to retain possession of the property 5 (thereby
misleading those creditors into thinking that the seller still owns the
property), may abscond with the proceeds of the sale, 66 or may sell
the property for an inadequate amount to a relative or friend. 7 The
law of some jurisdictions, including those that have adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act," requires proof of actual intent to
defraud creditors;69 other jurisdictions presume such an intent as a
63. See, e.g., Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N.W. 1117
(1892) (where corporation issued bonus stock to shareholders, thereby inflating capital account, creditors who relied on this figure had action in fraud against shareholders, even though
payment to corporation of such stock not required).
64. See generally 1 G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES & PREFERENCES § 1 (2d

ed. 1940).
65. See, e.g., Shauer v. Alterton, 151 U.S. 607 (1894); Shechter v. Shechter, 366 Pa. 30,
76 A.2d 753 (1950); Hewgley v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 39 Tenn. App. 553, 286
S.W.2d 355 (1955).
66. See, e.g., Cioli v. Kenourgios, 59 Cal. App. 690, 693, 211 P. 838, 841 (1922) (sending sale proceeds to foreign country held a badge of fraud).
67. See, e.g., Bailey v. Leeper, 142 Cal. App. 2d 460, 298 P.2d 684 (1956); Texas Sand
Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1964).
68. To date, twenty-six jurisdictions have adopted the Act. For a list of those jurisdictions, see 7A U.L.A. 27 (Supp. 1982). The Act requires actual intent to defraud creditors.
UNIFORM FRAuDuLENT CoNVEYANCE ACT J 7, 7A U.L.A. 242 (1978).
69. See, e.g., Wright v. Aaron, 214 Ark. 254, 258, 215 S.W.2d 725, 726-27 (1948);
Boone v. Roberts, 169 Colo. 238, 241-42, 455 P.2d 866, 867 (1969).
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matter of law. 70 Irrespective of such doctrinal variations, fraudulent
conveyance law teaches that remedy may be had not only against the
seller, but also against the purchaser. 1 Remedy is granted because
the purchaser can legitimately be considered a participant in an
act-a conveyance-that operated to defraud the seller's creditors.
Although the purchaser did not participate in increasing the quality
or performance risks to the sellers' creditors which gave rise to their
tort and/or contract claims, the purchaser of the assets has
foreseeably increased the creditors' recourse risk.
Comparable nexus exists in the prototypical fact pattern of successor corporation liability cases. As we have seen, the sale of assets
by the predecessor corporation, followed by payment of all known
creditor claims and the distribution of the net sale proceeds to stockholders, amounts to a failure on the part of stockholders to internalize all of the risks of their enterprise.7" They have shifted some of
the risks of their enterprise onto third party consumers and users
who, according to tort law, were expected to bear neither the quality
nor recourse risks.73
There are several ways in which the predecessor corporation
could provide for such claims, even though they are unknown.74
First, the corporation could set aside a fund sufficient to procure insurance for the foreseeable length of time that product liability
claims might arise. The second alternative is to contract for someone, other than an insurance company, to assume the liabilities when
they arise. The logical party to such a contract is the successor corporation. The predecessor corporation can easily compensate the successor corporation for assuming these expected liabilities by agreeing
to a lower purchase price. Presumably, the difference between the
two possible purchase prices would approximately equal the net present value of present and future insurance premiums that would protect the successor against claims arising from defects in the products
70. See, e.g., United States v. Ressler, 433 F. Supp. 459, 464 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Payne v.
Gilmore, 382 P.2d 140, 142 (Okla. 1963).
71.

See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 9, 7A U.L.A. 304 (1978). Some

cases have held that the purchaser is an indispensable party to an action brought by creditors.
See, e.g., Assurance Co. of Am. v. Southeastern Brick Co., 222 Ga. 638, 151 S.E.2d 708
(1966); Murray v. Murray, 358 So.2d 723 (Miss. 1978).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
73. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
74. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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sold by its predecessor,75 on top of those premiums paid to insure the
successor against claims on account of defects in the products it will
manufacture itself.
Besides its possible status as a direct or indirect insurer, the successor corporation cannot be considered an innocent party to the failure of the predecessor's stockholders to have internalized their investment risk. The successor is an active participant in the plan by
which the cost of internalizing future liabilities is avoided. Moreover,
it is a knowing active participant because, most frequently, the very
terms of the purchase and sale agreement provide for the predecessor
to liquidate after the sale.7 6 Finally, it is probably the negotiating
party who will insist on any clause in the purchase and sale agreement requiring liquidation, because the value of the assets'it has purchased would likely be less if the predecessor were to continue to use
the same trade name.
One should depart from present fraudulent conveyance law sufficiently to recognize that probability analysis should be applied to
liabilities. If one takes account of potential liabilities, the participation of the successor does not materially differ from the participation
of purchasers in fraudulent conveyance cases that hold against such
purchasers in favor of the sellers' creditors.
It is important to recognize that present law,77 with the exception of recent case law such as Ray v. Alad Corp.78 and its progeny,
has not been neutral with respect to whether the predecessor pro,
75. See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. at 354, 431 A.2d at 822.
The availability of products liability insurance to the successor, assumed by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Ramirez, id. at 354, 431 A.2d at 823, has' been questioned by a
number of commentators. See, e.g., Note, Corporations-ProductsLiability Under the De
Facto Merger Doctrine-Knappv. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974).
49 TEMP. L. Q. 1014, 1021 (1976); Note, Products Liability and Successor Corporations:
Protecting the Product User and the Small Manufacturer Through IncreasedAvailability of
Products Liability Insurance, 13 U.C.D. L. Rev. 1000, 1023 (1980); Case Note, Corporations-Sucessor'sTort Liability for Acts or Omissions of Predecessor-Cyrv. B. Offen &
Co., 16 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 676, 687 (1975).
The suggestion that such insurance is unavailable, however, seems untrue. When one corporation assumes the risk of products liability claims of another, the products liability insurer
of the assuming corporation typically will increase the premiums to reflect the additional risk.
Nonetheless, it is possible to obtain such coverage. From the standpoint of the insurer, the
situation is not unlike a merger, where the surviving corporation assumes all of the liabilities of
the dissolving corporation; the insurer is in a position to insure against injury claims arising out
of the defective products manufactured by the dissolving corporation.
76. See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 26, 560 P.2d at 6, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 3-6.
78. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1976).
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vides recourse for future tort claimants. Quite the contrary-present
law creates an incentive against the assumption of liabilities. If the
successor does not assume liabilities, the predecessor remains liable,
but only as a matter of theory. The predecessor corporation will liquidate, after providing for known creditors.7 9 If, on the other hand,
the successor agrees to assume all liabilities, the contingent as well
as the known, the successor obviously must bargain to deduct from
the purchase price the present value of future expected liabilities (or
the present value of insuring against such liabilities); the predecessor
would receive less for its business. The predecessor is, therefore, better off under present law if the successor declines to assume unknown liabilities.
On its part, the successor is certainly not inclined to insist that
it assume unknown, as well as known, liabilities, even if it can bargain to reduce the purchase price. There is apt to be some uncertainty about the present value of expected future claims arising from
the sale of past products. This uncertainty may be reduced, but it is
by no means eliminated, by insuring against the risk. The cost of
insurance is bound to increase at a rate that cannot be calculated
with certainty. On balance, the successor probably would prefer not
to gamble that the present value of future liabilities has been calculated too high rather than too low.
The aggregate wealth of both the predecessor and successor corporations and their respective stockholders, consequently, are enhanced by agreeing that the successor will not assume unknown liabilities. Thus, while it theoretically may be possible for them to
agree for the successor to assume the predecessor's unknown liabilities, one would expect it to occur rarely. The reported cases confirm
this supposition: There are few instances where successors have expressly assumed unknown liabilities.80
79. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 279-281 (1974).
80. For one such case, see Gee v. Tenneco, 615 F.2d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 1980). In most
cases, however, the successor expressly declines to assume any unknown liabilities, particularly
for contingent product claims. See, e.g., Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. at 371-72,
431 A.2d at 832; Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. at 338-39, 431 A.2d at 814.
Most practice aids and articles on successor liability either assume that the successor will
want to avoid liability for defective products of the predecessor, or flatly advise against assuming such liability. See, e.g., B. Fox & E. Fox, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, CORPORATE AcQuISITIONS & MERGERS § 29.0311] (1981); 1 J. HERZ & C. BALLER, BUSINESS AcQuisiTIoNs §
5.202d (2d ed. 1981); Note, Products Liability and Successor Corporations: Protectingthe
Product User and the Small ManufacturerThrough IncreasedAvailability of Products Liability Insurance,supra note 75, at 1006-07.
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Bulk Sales Law
Another transaction that substantially increases the creditor's
recourse risk is a bulk sale or transfer. Section 6-102 of the Uniform
Commercial Code defines a bulk transfer as "any transfer in bulk
and not in the ordinary course of the transferor's business of a major
part of the materials, supplies, merchandise or other inventory...
of an enterprise." 81 Most sales between predecessor and successor
corporations constitute bulk transfers within the meaning of Article
6,82 but that is not my point here. Nor is it my point that successor
corporations may have violated the provisions of Article 6 and that,
consequently, they can be held liable.8 3 Rather, Article 6, like its
older relative and antecedent, fraudulent conveyance doctrine,
presents an apt analogy with respect to the nexus question.
Under certain circumstances, Article 6 provides that bulk transfers are "ineffective" against the transferor's creditors8 "holding
claims based on transactions or events occurring before the bulk
' One effect of this voidability doctrine is to give the transtransfer."85
feror's known creditors8" a remedy against the transferee. Assets are
subject to the claims of the transferor's creditors unless the transferee complies with the requirements of sections 6-104, 6-105 and 6106. Section 6-104 requires "[t]he transferee [to require] . . .the
transferor to furnish a list of his existing creditors . . . , [the trans-

feror and transferee to] prepare a schedule of the property transferred sufficient to identify it; and

. . .

the transferee [to preserve]

U.C.C. § 6-102(1) (1978).
82. Section 6-102(2) states that "[a] transfer of a substantial part of the equipment...
of such an enterprise is a bulk transfer if it is made in connection with a bulk transfer of
inventory, but not otherwise." U.C.C. § 6-102(2). Most sales between predecessor and successor corporations, because they involve a sale of the whole business, will include a sale of inventory and, thus, be subject to Article 6.
83. The obligations of successor corporations under Article 6 relate to known creditors.
See infra text accompanying notes 84-90.
84. U.C.C. §§ 6-104(1), -105.
85. U.C.C. § 6-109(1).
86. Section 6-109(1) also states that "creditors who become such after notice to creditors is given. . . are not entitled to notice." U.C.C. 6-109(1) (emphasis added).
The same concern for fairness to the transferee seems to underlie § 6-109(2), which
states:
Against the aggregate obligation imposed by the provisions of this Article concerning the application of the proceeds . . . the transferee or auctioneer is entitled to
credit for sums paid to particular creditors of the transferor, not exceeding the sums
believed in good faith at the time of the payment to be properly payable to such
creditors.
U.C.C. § 6-109(2).
81.
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• . . the list and schedule for six months . . . following the transfer."' 87 Section 6-105 requires the transferee to give notice to such
creditors "at least ten days before he takes possession of the goods or
pays for them." 88 Nineteen jurisdictions have also adopted section 6106,89 which provides an additional "duty [on the transferee's part]
. . . to assure that such consideration [paid for the business] is applied so far as necessary to pay those debts of the transferor."90
It is easy to understand why a bulk transferee should be subject
to the duties that Article 6 imposes. Unlike a sale or sales in the
ordinary course of business, 91 a bulk transfer leaves the transferor in
a much greater state of liquidity than before.9 2 In fact, a bulk transfer frequently precedes a liquidation and dissolution of the transferor's business.9 3
To be sure, Article 6's provisions provide an analogy supportive
of successor corporations in the products liability cases. Fairness to
the transferee in a bulk transfer, as well as fairness to the transferor's creditors, was an obvious concern of Article 6's drafters.
Thus, Article 6 limits the obligations of the transferee to the transferor's known creditors.9 4 Nevertheless, if probability analysis is applied, and the possibility of insuring against risk based upon such
analysis is considered, the relative cost to the transferee of providing
recourse for the transferor's unknown creditors is foreseeable and,
therefore, almost as calculable as the sum necessary to provide for
the transferor's known creditors. Thus, the role of the successor corporation in increasing the recourse risk of future tort claimants does
not substantially differ from its role in increasing the recourse risk of
known creditors at the time of the transaction between the predecessor and successor corporations.
Risk Allocation Analysis
Risk allocation analysis is not distinct from fraudulent conveyance and bulk transfer law. Indeed, although fraudulent conveyance
87. U.C.C. § 6-104(l)(a)-(c).
88. U.C.C. § 6-105.
89. For a list of those jurisdictions which have adopted § 6-106, see 2A U.L.A. 314.
90.
91.

U.C.C. § 6-106(1).
See U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (definition of "Buyer in ordinary course of business").
92. 19 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 9315
(rev. perm. ed. 1978).
93. Id. §§ 9313, 9315.

94. See supra notes 83, 86.
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doctrine predates conscious recognition and usage of risk analysis,"
such doctrine quite obviously allocates risk among several commercial parties. Nor is risk analysis distinctly corporate and commercial;
other substantive bodies of law, torts for example, are recognized as
involving an allocation of risks." But ever since American legal
scholarship turned its attention to risk analysis early in the twentieth
century, 7 risk allocation has been common especially to corporate 8
and commercial law 9 scholarship.
To the extent that tort law allows an injured party a right of
recovery for a product defect, it is the predecessor corporation, and
indirectly its shareholders, who should bear that risk. In other words,
because the applicable torts rule makes the predecessor corporation
liable, 100 by definition it should bear the recourse risk. Even if the
predecessor successfully contracted to shift the risk elsewhere, such
as to an insurer, the predecessor corporation has been forced to internalize the risk through the payment of the insurance premiums.
The predecessor corporation may no longer exist, however, and its
stockholders may be scattered. Even if not scattered, its former
stockholders may have distributed the sums they received upon liquidation to numerous other parties who have relied upon receipt of
these sums.
In the absence of the predecessor, it must be determined
whether the injured party or the successor corporation should bear
the recourse risk. It is now commonly recognized that efficiency is
enhanced when risk is allocated to that party who, with the least
cost, can avoid it.101 With respect to the recourse risk, can the product user-tort victim or the successor corporation best decrease the
95. Fraudulent conveyance doctrine can be traced as far back as 1571. See An Acte
agaynst fraudulent Deedes Gyftes Alienations, &c., 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571). In contrast, risk
analysis became current in the twentieth century. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying
text.
96. See generally G. WHImT, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 96-102 (1980).
97. See Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REv. 1222, 1248-49 (1931).
98. See, e.g., Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk (pts. 1 & 2), 38
YALE L. J. 584, 720 (1929).

99. See, e.g., Moore, Sussman & Brand, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to
Orders to Stop Payment of Checks (pts. 1 & 2), 42 YALE L. J. 817, 1198 (1933); Patterson,

The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 335
(1924).

100. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOaRTs § 402A (1965).
101.

See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 136-37 (2d ed. 1977);

Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1,
4 (1978); Phillips, The Commercial Culpability Scale, 92 YALE L. J. (forthcoming, 1983).
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recourse risk by insuring that the predecessor corporation has provided for tort claims?
The product user is unlikely to protect himself against the recourse risk. In most cases where successor corporations have been
sued on products liability grounds, privity between injured party and
manufacturer is lacking.10 2 Even if privity is present, however, most
manufacturers do not go out of business and, thus, most product purchasers are not apt to think about and attempt to protect themselves
against the recourse risk. Further, even if the consumer were to
think of the possibility that the manufacturer would sell its operations and liquidate, the risk that the manufacturer will do so would
appear so remote as not to warrant affirmative action on the consumer's part. Consider the case of Chrysler Corporation. Few consumers have declined to purchase its products out of fear that
Chrysler might become insolvent and thus not be available to service
products sold or provide compensation for injuries resulting from defectively manufactured products. At most, one occasionally hears of
a consumer declining to purchase a Chrysler Corporation product
out of fear that servicing for such cars will be difficult.103
Furthermore, most consumers do not have access to the necessary information to make an accurate assessment of the recourse
risk. The information, first of all, must include the financial status of
the predecessor corporation. A corporation is likely to sell its assets
when the present value of returns expected on the financial assets to
be received as consideration for the sale of the manufacturing assets
exceeds the present value of returns expected on the manufacturing
assets. An accurate gauge of the recourse risk would have to take
account of both the manufacturer's rate of return on its present and
future assets, and possible rates of return on the investment of
financial assets received in the sale of the manufacturing assets. Further, the consumer would have to predict the existence of another
corporation whose calculation of the expected returns on the manufacturer's assets exceeds those on the investment of financial assets
that the manufacturer would receive in a sale. To the consumer of a
102, See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d at 25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576
(plaintiff fell from defective ladder owned by University of California while working for contracting company); Nieves v. Bruno Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. at 365, 431 A.2d at 828 (plaintiffs injuries caused by defective power press purchased secondhand by his employer ten years
before accident occurred); Ramirez v. Arnsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. at 335, 431 A.2d at 812
(plaintiff injured while operating defective power press presumably owned by his employer).
103. This fear has been labelled "the orphan-car syndrome." See Ross, Chrysler on the
Brink, FORTUNE, Feb. 9, 1981, at 41.
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product, the identity of such a potential buyer of the manufacturing
corporation's assets in the future is unknown, as is the financial data
necessary for such a computation. Need I go on to demonstrate that
the consumer and/or product user would need both an astrology doctorate as well as an M.B.A. degree to undertake these calculations!
Finally, it is unclear exactly how the consumer could protect
himself against the recourse risk. The consumer could, theoretically,
decline to purchase a product. Yet, given the consumer's lack of expertise in assessing the possibility that a manufacturer will liquidate
and, consequently, that its products pose a substantial recourse risk,
the consumer has few means to determine accurately which manufacturer's products to avoid.
Another theoretical recourse for the consumer is to make certain arrangements with the manufacturer to safeguard against the
risk. The arrangements might include a contractual pledge that the
manufacturer not go out of business, agreement by the manufacturer
to set up a specific fund sufficient to procure insurance against the
risk of defective goods, and so on. None of these arrangements seem
quite feasible. Among other difficulties, the risk of the manufacturer's nonperformance would inhere in almost all such protective
devices, and each consumer or user would have to expend transaction
costs in regard to these arrangements.
The successor corporation's position with respect to the product
consumer or user's recourse risk differs significantly. First, by the
time the successor transacts with the predecessor, the user's recourse
risk has increased substantially. Whereas to the consumer the recourse risk, if recognized, might seem remote and improbable, to the
successor corporation the risk approaches certainty. The successor
corporation need not expend additional resources to determine
whether the manufacturer wants to sell its assets; it knows such to be
the case. The successor need not expend additional resources to determine if a potential buyer for those assets is available; it qualifies
as that buyer. Moreover, if the law required the successor corporation to bear the recourse risk, the successor has the wherewithall
when transacting with the predecessor corporation to insure that it is
104
not left holding the ball.
In short, on the basis of the information that the successor corporation has acquired for other reasons, it can construct a posterior
probability with respect to the recourse risk, which is both far higher
104.

See supra text accompanying note 33.
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and more accurate than the anterior probability that the consumer
would be able to construct when purchasing the product. When negotiating with the predecessor corporation to purchase'the assets, the
successor can protect itself without an undue expenditure of transaction costs. The successor, in short, can protect against the recourse
risk at a lower cost than can the consumer or product user.
PRACTICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN APPROACHES

In addition to possibly proving more persuasive to courts that
have not confronted the issue of successor liability recently, the approach of this article might dictate a different result in several situations than would the torts oriented perspective articulated in recent
decisions. Consider three possible variants of the successor paradigm
wherein the successor purchases the assets and goodwill of the predecessor, the predecessor dissolves, and the successor continues to manufacture the predecessor's product line.
In the first variation, after five years, the successor discontinues
the manufacture of the predecessor's products and the use of its
goodwill. 105 If the ability to spread costs among all users of the same
product is integral to the tort analysis adopted by Ray and its progeny, it is not clear that the successor should be held liable.106 In
contrast, recourse risk analysis would dictate that the successor
should be held liable, whether or not it continues to manufacture the
same line of products under the same trade name. A later calculation by the successor that the product line and trade name that it
purchased from the predecessor is not worth what it paid is unfortunate from the successor's perspective, but does not change the successor's responsibility for substantially increasing the consumer's recourse risk. At the time that the assets were purchased, the successor
paid a positive value for the predecessor's goodwill. Thus, the successor had the opportunity to bargain in such a manner as to force the
predecessor to internalize the risks created by the manufacture and
sale of its products. Actual manufacture and use of the predecessor's
goodwill, therefore, is irrelevant to the imposition of liability pre105. See, e.g., Seipp v. Stetson Ross Mach. Co., 32 Wash. App. 224, 646 P.2d 783
(1982) (defendants did not produce same product which gave rise to plaintiffs injuries, nor did
defendants use original manufacturer's trade name).
106. Significantly, the court in Seipp did not apply the product line theory adopted in
Ray, in part because defendants did not use the goodwill and did not produce the same product. The court also considered the passage of time since manufacture and the existence of
numerous intermediary successors, a significant variation of the requisite product line elements. Id. at .,
646 P.2d at 786.
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mised on the creation of recourse risk.
Consider, next, a situation where the predecessor remains in
business, 10 7 but does not continue to produce the same product line.
If the cost spreading rationale is applied, the successor should be
susceptible to suit because, regardless of the predecessor's continuation, it is still in the best position to spread the losses among the
purchasers of the same line of products. Indeed, the New Jersey
courts, unlike the California Supreme Court, have not insisted upon
the nonavailability of the predecessor as a precondition to suit
against the successor. The recourse risk analysis probably dictates a
contrary result. The mere fact of the predecessor's continuation
means that the successor and predecessor did not bargain for the
latter to dissolve and liquidate. Since the predecessor would remain
in business to provide recourse to injured parties, the successor did
not actively participate in increasing the consumers' recourse risk.
Finally, suppose that the successor purchased all or some of the
predecessor's assets in a forced liquidation or similar proceeding.108
This is not a setting in which an accurate calculation of the extent of
quality claims, actual or incipient, is readily accomplished. Such statistics are based upon such data as the length of time the products
were manufactured, the number of products, and similar information. Nor is there bargaining between the predecessor and successor
by which the predecessor can be forced to internalize the recourse
risk. Rather, liquidation sales commonly occur when present creditors are fighting each other for a share of the pie. Discouraging the
successor from making as high a bid as possible in that context
would, on balance, probably work to the disadvantage of the predecessor's creditors. In contrast, it is not quite so clear why courts,
applying a cost spreading rationale, would deny recovery against a
predecessor in this situation, although I hasten to add that no court
has yet granted recovery against a successor corporation in this
context.109
107.

See, e.g., Barron v. Kane & Roach, Inc., 79 Il1.App. 3d 44, 34 Ill. Dec. 569, 398

N.E.2d 244 (1st Dist. 1979) (predecessor engaged in nonmanufacturing activities subsequent

to sale of assets).
108.

See, e.g., Foster v. Mooney Aircraft Corp., 68 Cal. App. 3d 887, 137 Cal. Rptr.

694 (1977) (successor purchased assets in bankruptcy proceeding); Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool
Corp., 111 Mich. App. 343, 314 N.W.2d 614 (1982) (successor acquired 8% of predecessor's

assets and continued to manufacture same product line).
109.

Cost spreading, along with an emphasis upon whether the successor is enjoying the

predecessor's goodwill, would probably not lead a court to hold the successor susceptible to
suit. Cost spreading, however, divorced from an emphasis upon the continuation of the good-
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CONCLUSION

Except for those who are prepared to impose tort liability anytime and anywhere regardless of conflicting considerations, readers
of the New Jersey and California courts' opinions are apt to be unpersuaded that successor corporations should be susceptible to suit.
The opinions do not persuade because they needlessly and fruitlessly
plow the terrain of the defendant successor's responsibility for the
product defect. Nexus between the injured tort victim and the successor corporation exists, instead, in the terrain of recourse risk. And
when addressing the recourse risk, rather than quality risk, courts
would be advised to till, rather than neglect, the fertile ground of
corporate and commercial law.
In addition to suggesting that successors can be held responsible
for increasing the recourse risk of third parties, corporate and commerical law doctrines suggest the contours of advisable limitations
on that responsibility. If the source of liability is the successor's act
of foreseeably increasing the consumer's recourse risk, of knowing
that consumers or users will be deprived of their right of recourse,
and of having the opportunity to influence events otherwise, liability
should not be imposed when the successor either cannot possibly
foresee liability for particular defects or exercise an opportunity for
the predecessor to provide for future claims.

will, might lead to liability.
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